皇冠网vip小说-皇冠网足球线上投注网-七匹狼娱乐城开户

首頁(yè) > 遼大學(xué)術(shù) > 正文

【經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)前沿高端講座系列】李建培:Behavior-based Pricing and Signaling of Product Quality

2022-10-22 10:11   來(lái)源:李安民經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院

遼寧大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)前沿高端講座第四講

              Behavior-based Pricing and Signaling of Product Quality        

     

主講人:李建培教授(對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易學(xué)院)  

主持人:張岸洲助理教授(遼寧大學(xué)李安民經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院)  

嘉賓介紹:馬湘君教授(遼寧大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)部)  

時(shí)間:2022年10月28日(周五)  14:00-15:30(北京時(shí)間)  

地點(diǎn):騰訊會(huì)議:907 4908 3431  

語(yǔ)言:中文  

摘要:The literature shows paradoxically that the widely-used practice of behavior-based pricing (BBP) is typically inferior to uniform pricing for a monopoly seller. We analyze the profitability of BBP in a setting where the monopoly seller holds private information about the quality of his product and interacts with the consumers in two periods. Relative to uniform pricing, BBP increases the consumers' sensitivity to a first-period price change and leads to a larger demand reduction when low-quality seller imitates the price choice of high-quality seller. Consequently, BBP lowers the price the high-quality seller needs to set to separate himself from a low-quality seller, decreases the signaling cost of high-quality product, and becomes a potentially profitable strategy both when the seller can and cannot commit to future prices. Moreover, the benefits to the seller do not come at the expense of the consumers because the average price is lower with BBP and consumer surplus also increases. In the separating equilibria that survive the intuitive criterion, the price pattern of high-quality product when BBP is allowed exhibits first-purchase discount that is widely observed in practice.  

主講人簡(jiǎn)介:李建培,對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教授、博士生導(dǎo)師。主要從事產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論和契約理論研究,研究題目包括團(tuán)隊(duì)生產(chǎn)中的錦標(biāo)賽機(jī)制、最優(yōu)采購(gòu)契約的設(shè)計(jì)、專(zhuān)家市場(chǎng)侵權(quán)責(zé)任設(shè)計(jì)、差別定價(jià)的福利影響等。多篇論文發(fā)表于經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)國(guó)際頂尖期刊,包括RAND Journal of Economics (3篇), Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economics(2篇),International Economic Review, International Journal of Industrial Organization,Social Choice and Welfare等。先后主持國(guó)家社科基金重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目、國(guó)家社科基金重大項(xiàng)目子課題、國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金青年項(xiàng)目、霍英東教育基金會(huì)基礎(chǔ)性研究項(xiàng)目,曾入選教育部新世紀(jì)優(yōu)秀人才計(jì)劃,并榮獲2018年中國(guó)信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)烏家培獎(jiǎng)。